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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the heterogeneity in the technical efficiency of a 
sample of French urban transport companies with a translog production frontier model. 
The model generates efficiency disentangling homogenous and heterogeneous variables. 
Our study concluded that outputs and inputs play a major role in transport efficiency and 
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1. Introduction 
Since Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) established the stochastic frontier 
model; bus companies technical efficiency has been the focus of a growing number of 
empirical studies (Jorgensen et al. 1995, Viton 1998, Odeck 2003). For example, the 
study surveyed by Brons, Nijkamp, Pels and Rietveld (2005) showed mixed results 
among the bus companies analyzed, with some displaying high level of efficiency, while 
others lagged behind. The importance of analyzing efficiency in the bus industry derives 
from the need that bus companies have to maintain their effectiveness, performing well in 
relation to alternative means of transport and increasing their market share by upgrading 
their productivity. Bus transport policy, Barros and Prieto Rodriguez (2008) has to take 
into account technical efficiency. In this environment, identifying the inefficient unit is of 
paramount importance, particularly if it can suggest ways of improving performance and 
converging towards the “best practice” frontier.  
Conceptually, it is useful to distinguish between different types of frontier: parametric, or 
stochastic frontier models (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), vs. non-parametric, or DEA-
Data envelopment Analysis (Charnes et al., 1978).  There are several generations of 
frontier models, namely the old homogenous frontier models (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 
1998), and new heterogeneous frontier models (Greene, 2005). Our approach is original 
since it used for the first time, as far as we know, the random frontier model on bus 
transportation.  
The motivation for the present research is as follows: firstly, past research has 
analyzed bus industry with either DEA models or stochastic homogenous frontier model. 
Therefore, the present paper enlarges previous research disentangling the variables in the 
production frontier in heterogeneous and homogenous (Greene, 2005). Second, the 
French bus industry provides transport to the population at a social price, which is lower 
than the costs incurred in its provision. Therefore, the local governments usually finance 
the deficits of bus companies. However, local organizing authorities are obliged to control 
public expenditure under the rules established by the national transport law
1 and the 
European Treaty
2, forcing public-financed bodies to perform their tasks in a cost-
controlling environment. In this context, improving efficiency would seem to be the best 
way forward (Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002). Third, since these enterprises operate 
                                                             
1 Loi d’Orientation sur les Transports Intérieurs (LOTI) 
2 Art. 76, 86 and 87, adapted to public transport services by regulation (EEC) n°1191/69, which should be 
upgraded in a close future by the regulation proposal COM(2005) 319 final.   3 3
exclusively in each urban area, they retain some monopoly power, which they cannot 
exploit because of the price setting that they are obliged to respect. The bus firm can, 
however, always shift costs from capital costs to operating costs in order to ask for a 
higher subsidy, or alternatively delay efficiency improvements in periods leading up to 
the introduction of new tariffs. In fact, the evaluation techniques used by the regulatory 
body are currently based only on financial reports (Quinet and Vickerman 2004). What it 
often proves difficult to clarify in an objective manner is the operational efficiency behind 
the financial reports, since these include no comment on, or analysis of operational 
performance. This is considered by management theory to be a vital component in a 
strategy designed to bring about improvements. Finally, two competing theories explain 
difference performance among firms operating in the same market. First, the strategic-
group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977) justifies differences in efficiency scores as being 
due to differences in the structural characteristics of units within an industry, which in 
turn lead to differences in performance. Second, resource-based theory (Barney, 1991 and 
Rumelt, 1991), which justifies different efficiency scores on the grounds of heterogeneity 
in relation to the resources and capabilities on which the bus companies base their 
strategies. Which theory explains different efficiency among French urban transport 
operators?  Finally, unobserved heterogeneity has been subject of concern and analysis in 
many recent works as Chesher (1984), Chesher and Santos Silva (2002) and McFadden 
and Train (2000). This type of model seems to be frequent in data concerning the 
behavior of different organizations, and neglecting it is likely to lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we present the contextual 
setting, describing the French bus industry and its characteristics. In section 3, we present 
a literature review. In section 4, we present the hypothesis. In section 5, we present the 
data and results. In section 6, we discuss the results. In section 7, we present the 
contribution and limitations of the paper and finally, in section 8, we present the 
conclusions.  
 
2. Contextual Setting  
The French urban transport is decentralised to local authorities (Kerstens, 1996). These 
urban authorities choose to provide transport services by its own operator ("régie"), or   4 4
alternatively delegates the operation to a private company or to a semi-public company 
("société d'économie mixte"). The not ‘in-house’ operators are legally selected through 
tendering processes, but competition is not very pregnant when a semi-public company 
wants to succeed to herself (Roy and Yvrande-Billion 2007). Whenever an organising 
authority delegates the operation, it signs a contract with the operator. Contracts can be 
defined according alternative regulating rules (Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002): (i) the net 
cost contract (“CFF: Compensation Financière Forfaitaire”) which provides incentives on 
receipts and costs; (ii) the gross cost contract (“GPF: Gestion à Prix Forfaitaire”) which 
allocates risks on costs to the operators and risks on receipts to the public authority and 
(iii) the management contract (“Gérance”), according to which all risks are borne by the 
public authority. Yvrande-Billon (2008). 
The main private companies are almost three international groups: Kéolis, Connex 
(Véolia) and Transdev. Data are collected under the responsibility of the CERTU (2003), 
a ministerial agency, and controlled by the GART (2002), a nation-wide association that 
gathers most of the local authorities in charge of an urban transport network. The 
unbalanced panel is composed of 135 French urban transport units, comprising all forms 
characterised above, including the cited three international groups. 
 
3. Literature Review 
There has been relatively extensive research into the bus industry using a variety of 
methods, Badami and Haider (2007). Seth et al. (2007). Restricting the survey to frontier 
models, we can see that there are some papers that use the non-parametric DEA model, 
whilst there are others that use the parametric econometric frontier (De Borger, Kerstens 
and Costa, 2002).  
Chu et al. (1992) adopted the DEA model to develop a single measure for the efficiency 
of a transit system in comparison with other agencies within the same peer group and 
suggested that the US had improved slightly over the period 1988-1992. Moreover, 
efficiency and effectiveness were found to be negatively correlated. Chang and Kao 
(1992) also adopted the DEA model to analyse municipal bus firms. Jorgenson, Pedersen 
and Solvoll (1995) analysed the efficiency of Norwegian bus firms with a homogenous  
stochastic frontier model. Kerstens (1996) analysed the efficiency of the French urban 
transit companies.   5 5
Holvad  et al. (2004) analysed the Norwegian bus industry with a Multi-directional 
efficiency analysis,
3 concluding that part of the improvement potential for companies in 
coastal areas is caused by topographical factors beyond the management control. Karlaftis 
and McCarthy (1997) adopted the DEA model to analyse the US transit system, 
contradicting the findings of Chu et al. (1992) regarding efficiency vs. effectiveness. 
Jorgenson et al. (1997) estimated a homogenous stochastic cost frontier model for the 
Norwegian bus industry and found no significant differences between public and 
privately owned operators. Viton (1998) also analysed the US bus industry with DEA in 
order to develop a single measure of efficiency. Cowie and Asenova (1999) analysed the 
efficiency of the British bus industry with DEA. Odeck and Alkadi (2001) analysed the 
efficiency of the Norwegian bus industry with DEA. They find potential for improving 
efficiency in the sector by about 28%. Odeck (2003) again analysed the efficiency of the 
Norwegian bus industry with a DEA model. A Man-Whitney rank test was used to test 
efficiency differences. Karlaftis (2004) used a two-step procedure to analyse the 
efficiency of the US transit system. In the first stage, a DEA procedure was used to 
disentangle efficiency from effectiveness. In the second stage, goal programming was 
used to find economies of scale. 
This bibliography is, in our view, relatively brief for what is such an important issue in 
the context of the bus market. With the present paper, we seek to enlarge upon the 
economics of transport and to draw the attention of other researchers to this neglected 
aspect of transport economics.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Our framework is based on two strands of literature: models of industry 
efficiency and stochastic frontier models. 
 
4.1. Models of Industry Efficiency 
Two competing models of industry efficiency exist in the literature. Firstly, the 
strategic-group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977) justifies differences in efficiency 
scores as being due to differences in the structural characteristics of units within an 
industry, which in turn lead to differences in performance. In the case of bus 
                                                             
3 Using almost the same data as Jorgenson et al. (1995) and Odeck and Alkadi (2001).   6 6
companies, units with similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies with 
similar results in terms of performance (Porter, 1979). Although there are different 
strategic options to be found among the different sectors of an industry, because of 
mobility impediments, not all options are available to each bus companies, causing a 
spread in the efficiency scores of the industry. Secondly, the resource-based theory 
(Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991), which justifies different efficiency scores on the 
grounds of heterogeneity in relation to the resources and capabilities on which the bus 
companies base their strategies. These resources and capabilities may not be perfectly 
mobile across the industry, resulting in a competitive advantage for the best-
performing bus companies.  
Purchasable assets cannot be considered to represent sources of sustainable 
profits. Indeed, critical resources are not available in the market. Rather, they are built 
up and accumulated on the bus’s premises, their non-imitability and non-
substitutability being dependent on the specific traits of their accumulation process. 
Thus, the difference in resources results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in 
the bus managers’ inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over time. In 
this context, unique assets are seen as exhibiting inherently differentiated levels of 
efficiency; sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned and 
controlled by the bus companies (Teece et al., 1997).  
 
4.2 Random Frontier Models 
In this paper, we adopt the stochastic cost econometric frontier approach. This approach, 
first proposed by Farrell (1957), came to prominence in the late 1970s as a result of the 
work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). 
The frontier is estimated econometrically and measures the difference between the 
inefficient units and the frontier by the residuals. This is an intuitive approach based on 
traditional econometrics. However, when we assume that the residuals have two 
components (noise and inefficiency), we have the stochastic frontier model. Therefore, 
the main issue is the decomposition of the error terms. Let us present the model more 
formally.  The general frontier cost function proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) is the following: 
   7 7
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where Cit represents a scalar cost of the decision-unit i under analysis in the t-th period; 
Xit is a vector of variables including the input prices and the output descriptors present in 
the cost function. The error term e decomposes into two components: first, the error term 
vit is the one that is traditional of the econometric models, assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed, that represents the effect of random shocks (noise) and is 
independent of uit. Second, the inefficient term uit represents the technical inefficiencies 
and is assumed to be positive and distributed normally with zero mean and variance
2
u σ .  
The positive disturbance uit is reflected in a half-normal independent distribution 
truncated at zero, signifying that each bus company’s cost must lie on or above its cost 
frontier. This implies that any deviation from the frontier is caused by management 
factors controlled by the bus company.  
The total variance is defined as 2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + = . The contribution of the error term to the 
total variation is as follows:  ) 2 1 /( 2 2 λ σ σ + = v . The contribution of the inefficient term 
is:  ) 2 1 /( 2 2 2 λ λ σ σ + = u . Where  2
v σ  is the variance of the error term v,  2
u σ  is the 





λ = , providing an indication of 
the relative contribution of u and v to ε=u+v. 
Because estimation procedures of equation (1) yield merely the residual ε, rather than the 
inefficiency term u, this term in the model must be calculated indirectly (Greene, 2000). 
In the case of panel data, such as that used in this paper, Battese and Coelli (1988) used 
the conditional expectation of uit, conditioned on the realized value of the error term 
) ( it u it v it + = ε , as an estimator of uit. In other words,  [ ] it it u it E ε ν / +  is the mean 
productive inefficiency for the i th bus company at any time t.  
But the inefficiency can also be due to heterogeneity of the bus firms. For taking in 
account heterogeneity we consider the following random effects model: 
it it it i it u v w c + + + + = x β' ) ( 0 β                         (1) 
where the variables are in logs and  i w  is a time invariant, firm specific random term that 
captures company heterogeneity.   8 8
To estimate the model, the random coefficient model requires the identification condition 
that the random components of the coefficients be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables.  A second issue concerns the stochastic specification of the inefficiency term u. 
For the latter, we assume the half normal distribution. 
For the estimation of the parameters of this model, we construct the likelihood function 
using the approach proposed by Greene (2005). With the previous assumptions, the 
conditional density of cit given  i w is: 
it i it it
it it
i it w c w c f x β' ) (    ,    
2
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where φ  is the standard normal distribution and Φ the respective cumulative distribution 
function. The parameters λ  and σ
2 were defined before. 
Conditioned on  i w , the T observations for company i  are independent and therefore the 
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The log likelihood, ∑
i
i L log , is then maximised with respect to the parameters β0, β, σ, λ 
and any parameters appearing in the distribution of wi . The integral in (4) will be 
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We propose to compute the log likelihood by simulation. Averaging the function in (5) 
over sufficient draws from the distribution of wi will produce a sufficiently accurate 
estimate of the integral in (4) to allow estimation of the parameters (see Train, 2002). The 
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Consider a French bus company operating in a city. Based in previous research, Roy and 
Yvrande-Billon (2007), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), the frontier model allows the 
definition of the following null hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (public vs. private): Public companies are less efficient than private 
companies. This hypothesis is based on the traditional hypothesis related to private versus 
public property in markets (Williamson 1979). This is a traditional assumption in 
transportation markets (Chang and Kao 1992, Roy and Yvrande-Billon 2007). Reasons to 
support this hypothesis is that with private ownership the rewards and costs of the activity 
are more directly concentrated in the stockholders restricting the principal-agent 
relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, there are some research that found no 
evidence that private operators are more efficient than public operators (Caves and 
Christensen 1980), justifying the present hypothesis. This hypothesis will be tested by the 
variables public and private (managed, net and gross). 
Hypothesis 2 (Private companies managed by cost plus contract): Private companies 
with cost plus contract perform efficiently. This hypothesis is based in the theory of 
transaction costs and property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986). This theory is based in 
two critical assumptions: first, the firms cannot write complete contracts concerning their 
transport allocation based in the cost-plus rule; second, investments are specific to firms' 
assets so that the same investment is less valuable with different assets. When both 
assumptions hold, the theory predicts that firms under-invest because they are afraid that 
their relationship with the other firm may end at same point. To minimise under-
investment, firms allocate dedicated asset specificity (Williamson, 1981), which refers to 
investment that take place with the prospects of selling a significant amount of product to 
a particular customer. Therefore, assuming the asset specificity strategy, private 
companies managed by cost plus contract that are assumed to be efficient. This 
hypothesis will be tested with the variable managed. 
Hypothesis 3 (Private companies with Net cost Contract): Private companies with net 
cost contract perform efficiently searching for profits. This hypothesis is based on 
previous research on transportation and on the strategic-group theory (Caves and Porter,   10 1
1977) which justifies differences in efficiency scores as being due to differences in the 
structural characteristics of units within an industry. In the case of bus companies, units 
with similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies with similar results in terms of 
performance (Porter, 1979). Although there are different strategic options to be found 
among the different sectors of an industry, because of mobility impediments, not all 
options are available to each bus companies, causing a spread in the efficiency scores of 
the industry. Therefore it is assumed that French private bus companies, with net cost 
contract, adopt this type of contract because it corresponds to a strategy inherent to an 
efficient drive. This hypothesis will be tested by the variable Net. 
Hypothesis 4 (private companies with gross cost contract): Private companies with 
gross cost contract perform efficiently searching for profits. This hypothesis is based on 
previous research on the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991), which 
justifies different efficiency scores on the grounds of heterogeneity in relation to the 
resources and capabilities on which the bus companies base their strategies. These 
resources and capabilities may not be perfectly mobile across the industry, resulting in a 
competitive advantage for the best-performing bus companies. Purchasable assets cannot 
be considered to represent sources of sustainable profits. Indeed, critical resources are not 
available in the market. Rather, they are built up and accumulated on the bus’s premises, 
their non-imitability and non-substitutability being dependent on the specific traits of 
their accumulation process. Thus, the difference in resources results in barriers to 
imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in the bus managers’ inability to alter their accumulated 
stock of resources over time. In this context, unique assets are seen as exhibiting 
inherently differentiated levels of efficiency; sustainable profits are ultimately a return on 
the unique assets owned and controlled by the bus companies (Teece et al., 1997). This 
hypothesis is tested with the variable Gross. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested with the random frontier model. 
 
5. Data and Results 
To estimate the production frontier, we used panel data on French urban transport 
companies for the years 1995 to 2002 (8 years, 135 units resulting in an unbalanced panel 
data of 981 observations). The data was obtained from two sources, a ministerial agency,   11 1
CERTU,
4 and a nation-wide professional organisation that gathers most of the local 
authorities in charge of an urban transport network, GART.
5 
Frontier models require the identification of inputs (resources) and outputs 
(transformation of resources). Several criteria can be used in their selection. One 
empirical criterion is available. For the applicability of the model’s results and its 
management, it is important to “buy in” to the process that the measures of inputs and 
outputs are relevant and adequately measurable, and that appropriate archival data are 
available. Usually this latter criterion is used, since it encompasses the other two already 
mentioned criteria. Secondly, the literature survey is a way of ensuring the validity of the 
research and therefore constitutes another criterion that needs to be taken into account. 
The final criterion for measurement selection is the professional opinion of managers. In 
this paper, we follow the first two criteria. 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the variables used in the analysis. We transformed 
the variables according to the description column. We adopted the traditional log-log 
specification to allow for the possible non-linearity of the frontier.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data  1995-2002 




The number of kilometers 
cover by vehicles 
5.251 7.056  6.169  0.445 
Log (Labour1)  The number of equivalent 
employees-drivers 
1.945 6.537  4.118  1.063 
Log(Labour2)  The number of equivalent 
employees non-drivers 
-0.693 4.036  2.997 1.562 
Log (Energy)  The quantity of diesel m3 
consumed 
1.799 6.779  4.777  1.659 
Log (Vehicles)  The number of vehicles  1.609  4.127  3.819  2.103 
Log (network 
length) 
The total lines length   2.639  5.319  4.790  0.805 
Log Journey  The number of journey
6   5.153  10.553  8.170   
Public  Public company  0  1  0.065      
Managed  Private company operating 
under management (cost-
plus) contract 
0 1  0.145   
Net  Private company with net 
cost contract 
0 1  0.326   
Gross  Private company with 
gross cost contract 
0 1  0.253   
 
                                                             
4 Centre d'Etude et de Recherche sur les Transports Urbains. 
5 Groupement des Autorités Responsables du Transport. 
6    A trip usually involves more than one single journey.  Typically, if somebody travel in two 
different buses to reach her destination (a unique trip), the number of journey counted is two.   12 1
The variable Semi-public is not considered in the analysis to avoid perfect collinearity 
with public and private variables (Gujarati, 2003, page 302). In this condition the constant 
will represent the mean value of the semi-public.  
  
5.1 Results 
The translog is flexible functional form that provides a second order approximation to any 
arbitrarily twice differentiable function. The production function does not employ 
separability and homogeneity hypothesis; neither assumes constant or unitary elasticity of 
substitution between inputs. Rather, the separability and homogeneity assumptions can be 
tested and the values of elasticity of substitution vary for every data point in the input 
space. Although the translog functional form has these advantages, there are some 
limitations. First, the translog function does not always provide a good approximation 
over a wide range of observations. The curvature conditions of the production function 
(monotonicity and quasi-concavity) can be violated, even though the approximating 
function fits the data very well. This however, does not necessarily imply the absence of 
an underlying profit-maximizing process of the production function, but simply reflects 
the inability of the functional form to approximate the true function over the range of the 
data. Secondly, if used as an exact form, the translog functional forms are inflexible in 
providing a second-order approximation to an arbitrarily weakly separable function, 
Blackborby et al. (1977). 
 
In this study, we estimate a stochastic Translog production function with four inputs 
(Labour, Energy, Vehicles, Network Length), one output descriptors (Journey) and 
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This is the production frontier model, known as the error components model in Coelli, 
Rao and Battese (1998) where log(Vehicle-Kmsi,t) is the natural logarithm of the 
output); log Xjit is the natural logarithm of the j
th input  (Labour, Energy, Vehicles,   13 1
Network Lenght) from bus company i
th in period t;  logYkit is the natural logarithm of 
the k
th output descriptor (Journeys) from the bus company i in period t. Public, Semi-
public, Net and Gross are dummy variables to account for the property role in the 
technical change and  ζ ς κ η θ δ π ψ β ϕ α τ τ τ , , , , , , , , , , , 2 , 1 , 0 kj js kr j j k k  are 
coefficients to be estimated. The usual symmetry restrictions are imposed in estimating 
the model, following Young's theorem that requires the symmetry restrictions, which 
correspond to:  
rk kr π π = for all k and r, and  sj js δ δ = for all j and s. These restrictions reduce the 
number of parameters to be estimated, Cornes (1992). 
Table 2 presents the results obtained for the stochastic frontier adopting a half-normal 
distribution specification for the costs function frontier. For comparative purposes, a non 
random frontier model alongside a traditional cost function is estimated. A Gauss 
program was used. 
 
 
Table 2: Stochastic Translog panel cost frontier  
(Dependent variable: Log Vehicle-Km) 
 
Variables Translog  Random 
Frontier model 
Translog Non Random 
Frontier Model 
















log Labour 2  0.021 
(4.218)* 
0.085 
(3.219)*   14 1








log Network Length     0.205 
(3.128)* 
log Journey     0.071 
(4.125)* 


















































































Log Labour2*log Network  length  0.178  0.135   15 1
(2.954)  (3.078) 












































Mean of Random parameters     
Log Network length   0.219 
(3.217)* 
 
Log Journeys   0.082 
(4.321)* 
 
Scale Parameters for Dists. of 
Random Parameter 
   
Log Network Lenght   0.352 
(3.892)* 
 
Log Journeys   0.129 
(4.521)* 
 






















Observations 981  981 
t statistics in parentheses are below the parameters; those followed by * are significant at 1% level. 
 
A first step in the estimation procedure was to check the sign of the third moment and the 
skewedness of the OLS residuals associated with the sample data (Waldman, 1982). The   16 1
third moment for the terminal frontier was –0.181, the negative sign implying that the 
residuals possess the correct pattern for the implementation of the maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure used in the frontier models. In the literature survey, we find out that for 
the most part, the papers on bus efficiency use the traditional Cobb-Douglas model. A 
conventional reason for using this model is the data span used in the analysis. An additional 
reason stems from statistical tests (usually a likelihood test which compares the likelihood 
function value for each model). However, it is recognised that the Cobb-Douglas model 
possesses several restrictive characteristics that make it undesirable, particularly if we have a 
data span that allows the estimation of a less restrictive model, such as the Translog. Among 
these undesirable characteristics, the Cobb-Douglas assumes that all bus companies have the 
same production, scale elasticities and unitary elasticities of substitution. The Translog model 
overcomes all these restrictions, being a more flexible functional form. However, the final 
decision between Translog and Cobb-Douglas is based on the likelihood test of both 
functional forms, with the Translog doing a better job in explaining variations in the sample 
data used in this paper compared to the Cobb-Douglas function. These problems become 
more serious when excluded inputs are unobservable to the researcher, but observable to the 
producer. This situation influences the input mix and causes the explanatory variable matrix 
to be correlated with the error vector (Fuss et al., 1978). The Translog frontier model was 
estimated without the traditional share equations in order to not introduce further restrictions 
into the estimated parameters (Khumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The use of share equations in 
frontier models allows the desegregation of overall cost inefficiencies into technical and 
allocative components, but it is subject to a restrictive hypothesis, which makes them almost 
unusable for efficient analysis (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). To allow direct interpretation 
of the first order Translog parameters as elasticities evaluated at the sample mean, every 
series was divided by its average (Coelli et al., 2003, page 33).  
It can be verified that the production function specified above fits the data well, as both the 
R-squared value and the overall F-statistic from the initial ordinary least-squares estimation 
used to obtain the starting values for the maximum-likelihood estimation are high.  Having 
estimated two competing models, the homogeneous Translog frontier model and the 
heterogeneous Translog frontier model, the Likelihood test enables the selection of the most 
adequate functional form, which is the heterogeneous frontier model in the present case. The 
likelihood test is a statistical test of goodness of fit between two competing models. It 
compares models with different number of parameters. Comparing the models, the 
Likelihood test has a chi-square distribution with 2 degree of freedom and, in the present   17 1
case, its value is 1252.343, with a critical value for p=0.01 equal to 8.991. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the Heterogeneous frontier model describes better the data set than the 
Translog model. 
We also compute the chi-square statistics that serve as a general specification test of adding 
variables to model. Based on the estimated values, it can be concluded for a critical value for 
p=0.000 that the chi-square is equal to 2504.66. Therefore, it is concluded that the addition of 
variables by the heterogeneous frontier model is supported by the test, signifying that the 
heterogeneous frontier better describes the data set. Finally, the Sigma square and lambda 
variables of the frontier models are statistical significant, which means that a traditional cost 
function is unable to capture adequately all dimensions of the data set. Both variables are 
statistical significant. The value of parameter lambda is positive and statistically significant in 
the stochastic inefficiency effects.  
We also verify that the coefficients of the variables have the expected signs, with the 
production growing with the trend signifying technological improvement during the period. 
Moreover, the production increases at decreasing rate according the trend square variable, 
signifying that technological improvement increases at decreasing rate.  
Finally, the production increases with all variables with the exception of the output descriptor 
of managerial practice: Public company. The rationality for this negative values are that 
public companies under cost contracts shrink their production to ensure adequate profits, 
which is a sound economic transport policy, that may results in lower quality and decreasing 
production. Moreover, network length and journeys parameters are random parameters, 
meaning that they vary along the sample. The identification of the mean values of random 
parameters means that the number of networks and journeys are heterogeneous through the 
sample. Therefore, a policy to increase production has to take into account this heterogeneous 
characteristic of the sample. Thus, a common policy can be defined for the sample based on 
the average values of the homogeneous variables, but no common policy can achieve all 
clusters identified in heterogeneous variables. Different policies for the different segments 
companies by network length and journey are needed. The model does not identify how many 
clusters exist in the sample and identifies only their heterogeneous nature. However, other 
techniques can be applied to identify the clusters (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2005). The scale 
parameters of the heterogeneous variables are small but statistical significant, meaning that 
the heterogeneity of the variables is statistical supported.  
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6. Economic Implications of the Study  
 
This paper has proposed a simple framework for the evaluation of urban transit companies 
and the rationalisation of their management activities, taking into account the traditional input 
and output descriptors of transport activity. The analysis is based on a random stochastic 
production frontier model, allowing for the incorporation of contextual variables. Since the 
paper uses an unbalanced data set, it cannot present efficient scores for each company.  
How do we interpret these results? The main result of the present paper is that random 
frontier models better describe French bus companies than homogeneous frontier models. 
The implication of this result is that a common government policy towards French bus 
companies is unable to reach all companies, since heterogeneity exists relative to the network 
length and journeys obtained. Therefore any economic policy targeting any of these 
heterogeneous variables has to be tailored by clusters.  
What is the rationality of this result? This is an intuitive result, since bus companies are not 
homogeneous. There are small, large and medium companies defined by network length and 
the journeys performed. These visible characteristics translate into different performances 
obtained in the market, resulting in different clusters in the market. These clusters are 
distinguished from each other based on network length and journey. This result also signifies 
that French bus companies are relatively homogeneous on the labour, energy and vehicles. 
With regard to labour, this means that competition over resources drives the market and 
translates into homogeneous dynamics in the labour market.  Additionally, in the case of 
vehicles and energy, it signifies that a certain level of investment in capital is a pre-requisite 
in this market, which translates into homogeneous behaviour.  
Another result is that the trend is positive: the production increases over time. This is an 
expected result for this industry. Bus industry is driven by technology improvements, based 
on intense competition observed in the market; therefore a positive sign is expected for the 
production frontier. Moreover the trend is at a decreasing rate. Third, the lambda inefficient 
parameter signifies that on average 28.1% of the costs are imputable to inefficiency 
according to the homogenous frontier. The blurring of heterogeneity with inefficiency is 
therefore a generic characteristic of homogenous stochastic frontier models. However, this 
value translates into 11.2% in the heterogeneous frontier, signifying that heterogeneity 
translates into inefficiency in the homogenous frontier models. Moreover the sigma is 
smaller in the random frontier model, signifying that the average homogenous inefficiency 
includes heterogeneity.    19 1
How does these results compare with the findings in similar research?  The main conclusion 
is that the inefficient parameters are relatively low, when compared with similar results of 
Jorgenson  et al. (1997). However, the period of analysis is different and this fact may 
explain the different efficient scores. In the period analysed competition among different 
transport modes has increased at European level forcing bus companies to adopt efficient 
procedures. Consequently, this phenomenon should be reflected in better performance, 
lower customer prices and improved service quality. Competitive pressures force every bus 
company to be close to the frontier of best practices. This signifies that these companies 
work under more, or less, similar managerial procedures and allocation rules. This rule 
forces the companies to converge to the frontier displaying a small lambda. Mergers and 
acquisitions are expected to follow a deregulation process, Odeck (2008). 
What is the policy implication of the present research? The main policy implication, based 
on the result of labour variable, is that the competition by resources drives the market and 
translates in homogenous dynamics. Additional, the results of capital and vehicles variables 
signifies that a certain level of investment is a pre-requisite in this market translating into 
homogenous behaviour. Having invested, the French bus companies display different 
dimensions measured by the value of the assets, and different locations. This dimension 
defines network length and the population served, which translates statistically in 
heterogeneity. Heterogeneity represents characteristics that influence the cost of the French 
bus companies analysed, which are not measured or observed but are displayed in the 
measurement errors. 
How do we interpret the hypothesis? We accept hypothesis 1, validating that the private 
enterprises are more efficient than private enterprises. This validation results directly from 
the results, with the public dummy decreasing production, while all other private 
characteristics (managed, net, gross) increase production. This result is validated by 
previous research in this field, Yvrande-Billon (2007), Roy and Yvrande- Billon (2007). 
Moreover, we accept hypothesis 2 since managed is positive and statistical significant. This 
result is supported by the competition supported by cost-plus private companies in the 
market. Furthermore, we accept hypothesis 3, because Net is positive and statistical 
significant. Finally, we accept hypothesis 4, because Gross is positive and statistical 
significant. This result is in line with Roy and Yvrande- Billon (2007) signifying that private 
enterprises are organizational focused on performance, Brewer and Hensher (1998), and 
differences may arise in quality, Hensher and Stanley (2003) which we could not take into 
account.   20 2
Which theory (strategic group theory vs. resource based theory) explains differences in 
efficiency among French bus companies?  Both theories explain a part of the reality 
analysed. Difference in structural characteristics (for example public and private) leads to 
differences in performance, validating the strategic group theory, (Caves and Porter, 1977). 
Differences in human and material resources results in heterogeneity in performance, 
validating the resource based theory (Barney, 1991 and Rumelt, 1991).  




7. Contribution, Limitations and Extensions of this Study 
 
In the light of the extensive literature on productivity in the bus industry, it is useful to 
consider the potential contributions of the current research. Based on the literature survey, 
we estimated a random stochastic frontier model for urban transport efficiency. 
Moreover, we adopted the error component model proposed by Coelli et al. (1998), which 
takes into account efficiency that is due to the enterprise. Finally, our stochastic 
production frontier model lends support to similar works by Jorgensen et al. (1995), 
Jorgensen et al. (1997).  
However, it is worth noting that our construct has a stronger theoretical foundation, since 
it takes into account the heterogeneity, Chesher (1984), Chesher and Santos-Silva (2002), 
McFadden and Train (2000). Heterogeneous behavior is commonly observed in the 
market; not to take it into account is likely to lead to inconsistent parameter estimates or 
more importantly, inconsistent policy definitions. Therefore any transport policy has to 
take this heterogeneity in account when defining a public policy towards the French bus 
companies. The homogeneity of the bus companies used in the previous research is 
questionable, since it compared units of different characteristics. 
A variety of extensions can be made to this paper. Firstly, based in the heterogeneity 
identified a latent production frontier (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004) can identify 
endogenous segments. Second, a cost frontier model could be applied in order to identify 
economies of scale and scope.  
 
8. Conclusion   21 2
 
This article has proposed a simple framework for the evaluation of public transport 
companies and the rationalisation of their operational activities. The analysis is based on a 
production frontier model that allows for the incorporation of multiple inputs and outputs 
in determining relative efficiencies. The disentangling of homogenous and heterogeneous 
variables was achieved. Several interesting and useful managerial insights and 
implications arise from the study. The general conclusion is that the heterogeneity exists 
in the some variables and, therefore, homogenous transport policy is unable to achieve in 
a symmetric way all companies. Homogenous stochastic frontier models blur 
heterogeneity with inefficiency, Greene (2005). Therefore, the present result is an 
improvement in the measurement of organizational technical efficiency. 
The results suggest that labour, energy and vehicles are the main determinant factors of 
efficiency in this sector. A management policy for improving efficiency should take these 
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